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Constitutionalizing Class Inequality:
Due Process in State Farm
MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEYt

As a step toward the goal of constructing a story of class
in constitutional law, this Essay explores a recent Supreme
Court decision about due process: State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.' In State Farm, the
protection of wealthy business owners is not simply one
substantive goal among many to be debated in a pluralist
state and society. Instead, the Court implicitly equates
protection of upper-class interests with fundamental
fairness, essential to neutral legal process. Correspondingly,
this case constructs protection of opposing class interests as
violations of fundamental fairness, impossible for neutral
legal process.
I. POST-LOCHNER PROCESS AS ECONOMIC EQUALITY

On the surface, modern U.S. constitutional law
generally appears to abstain from taking sides in conflicts
of economic class. In the conventional wisdom, since the
Lochner era of the early twentieth century, 2 the
Constitution treats questions of economic inequality as
matters of policy largely immune from scrutiny by the
judicial branch. 3 In the standard theory, the quintessential

t William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar and Professor, State University of New
York at Buffalo.
1. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
2. The case for which the era is named, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), struck down a state law regulating maximum hours for certain workers
as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
3. A typical casebook summary explains:
The Court has made it clear that economic regulations-laws
regulating business and employment practices-will be upheld

1035

1036

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

function of the political process is to balance or reconcile
competing economic interests. 4 The prevailing assumption
is that economic interests are highly amenable to pluralistic
bargaining and majority rule, since economic losers in one
deal can readily regroup and re-negotiate to defend their
interests another day or in another deal. In contrast, the
conventional constitutional theory holds that the judicial
branch has particular power to oversee legislative or
executive branch decisions involving issues of race or
gender inequality because a history of racial and genderbased prejudice, barriers, and insularity renders the
political process suspect. 5 This theory assumes that race
and gender interests can involve comprehensive and
persistent class or caste identity, but that economic
interests are distinctively narrow, transitory, fluid, and
context-specific. 6 In this view, the Federal Constitution
appropriately restricts economic equality rights to the
limited protections of process, not substance.
Mainstream jurisprudence holds that this processbased approach to economic rights, whatever its occasional
when challenged under the Due Process Clause so long as they
are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose ....
The reality is that virtually any law can meet this very
deferential requirement.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545 (2d ed. 2005).

4. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963) ('Under the
system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time
when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which
were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some
particular economic or social philosophy .... It is now settled that States 'have
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul
of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or some valid federal law"'
(quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536
(1949))).
5. For the influential footnote articulating this exception to the rule of
deference to legislative policy judgments, see United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
6. See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 472 (1974) (criticizing Richard A. Posner's
casebook, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973), for defining economic interests in
narrow categories like "landowner, pedestrian, and corporate lawyer" rather
than, for instance, "upper middle class").
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unfortunate or unwise effects, remains a relatively neutral
and sound resolution of the class bias that plagued the
constitutional doctrine of the early twentieth century
Lochner era. The conventional view explains the New Deal
move from a substantive to a procedural approach to class
as a fair deal that ensures the Constitution will favor the
substantive interests of neither capital nor workers, rich
nor poor, business nor consumers. As Justice O'Connor
noted, echoing Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner, "[t]he
Constitution does not require the states to subscribe to a
particular economic theory."7
One problem with this mainstream view is that the line
between legal substance and process is slippery and
strategic.8 Many constitutional commentators concerned
about economic inequality have lamented the lack of
fundamental substantive rights to basic income or basic
rights for workers. 9 Nonetheless, they typically acknowledge
that even this limited vision of substantive constitutional
protection for economic equality remains far "off the table"
and even "off the wall" of mainstream constitutional law.10
But the real action on issues of class in constitutional
law may be taking place under the rubric of process. That
action has two prongs. First, class inequality can be
constitutionalized by casting substantive protections for
wealthy capital owners' interests in a procedural guise as
narrow technicalities or as neutral formal principles.
Second, class inequality can be constitutionalized by

7. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 300 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987)).
8. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of Formal Corporate
Power, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453, 1464-67 (2006).
9. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 10-13 (2004)

(explaining and developing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1944 State of the
Union speech proposing a constitutional commitment to a living wage, decent
housing, medical care, education, and income during unemployment, disability
and retirement).
10. William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique
and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1824 (2001) (quoting J.M.
Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1703, 1733 (1997)).
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recasting basic procedural protections for the non-wealthy
into illegitimate claims to substantive rights.
II. REVIVING LOCHNER'S SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION FOR
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

In its 2003 due process ruling in State Farm, the U.S.
Supreme Court makes both of these slippery moves
between substance and process to produce what corporate
lawyers billed as "a big win for corporate America."'1 First,
State Farm reinforces and legitimizes a zone of substantive
protection from political and legal challenge for multistate
and multinational corporations. In contrast to the Lochner
era, which grounded protection for business interests in
substantive due process rights, State Farm attempts to
defend privileged constitutional status for organized capital
largely in terms of procedural neutrality. Second, State
Farm turns the mere process of engaging the political and
legal system in opposition to capital interests into arbitrary
substantive privilege.
I have discussed State Farm in another article as an
example of the problem of how corporations distort the civil
justice system.12 That article was a response to Marc
Galanter's analysis of the numerous ways the U.S. civil
justice systematically privileges large corporations over real
human beings. 13 I argued that the skewing of the civil
justice system toward corporate "artificial persons" and
against unorganized natural persons is not simply an
unfortunate but necessary and natural byproduct of a
modern legal system characterized by complex, formal rules
and
institutions
rather
than
informal
personal
interactions.' 4 Instead, corporate power in the courts should
11. Edward Walsh & Brooke A. Masters, Justices Overturn Big Jury Award,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2003, at El (reporting the views of legal experts and
corporate defense attorneys); see also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD:
THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM 503 (2008) (noting that the Skadden,

Arps law firm quoted this comment on its web site as part of the biographical
highlights for a partner who represented State Farm).
12. McCluskey, supra note 8, at 1489.
13. Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006).

14. McCluskey, supra note 8, at 1456.
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be understood as the product of a series of specific,
contingent, and contested substantive legal rules that
helped privilege large corporations and their wealthy
capital owners at the expense of competing economic
interests, organized or not. 15 That article ended by
explaining how State Farm continues this trend: it confers
particular, and particularly problematic, substantive rights
on large corporate entities that further disadvantage
"natural persons" in the civil justice system and beyond. 16
This Essay revisits State Farm to analyze its
implications for understanding the treatment of class in
constitutional doctrine. In State Farm, the Supreme Court
overturned a punitive damage award against a corporate
defendant, 17 further developing a new constitutional
doctrine limiting punitive damage awards that greatly
exceed compensatory damages.' 8 On the surface, the case
seems to present a fairly narrow doctrinal issue generally
treated as peripheral to the "canon" of basic constitutional
law courses, and also as marginal to general discussions of
constitutional economic equality rights. 19 But beneath the
narrow doctrinal issue lie assumptions about economic class
that have broader implications for the understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment and for constitutional law more
generally.
In the case leading to State Farm, Utah's highest court
had affirmed the state trial court's findings that the State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had
systematically, deliberately, and even maliciously violated
consumers' contractual rights in order to increase its profits
15. See id. at 1475-89.
16. Id. at 1489-98.
17. 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
18. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (ruling that
due process limits punitive damage awards that are "grossly excessive," to be
measured by the reprehensibility of the conduct, the disparity between the
punitive damage amounts and amount of harm to the individual victim, and the
difference between the punitive damages and civil penalties for comparable
misconduct).
19. For an insightful discussion of this emerging Supreme Court doctrine
concerning punitive damages, see Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From
Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007). For an extensive discussion of the
facts and litigation in the State Farm case, see STEMPEL, supranote 11.
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at the expense of auto insurance policyholders and their
accident victims. 20 One of the practices at issue involved
breach of State Farm's duty to settle in a third-party auto
accident case brought against a policyholder, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell's car insurance policy had a liability limit of
$25,000 per person injured, capped at $50,000 per accident,
and the accident at issue left one victim dead and a second
disabled. 21 The attorneys representing the victims made
repeated attempts to settle the case for the policy limits,
but
22
State Farm refused, despite strong evidence of liability.
When budget-conscious drivers (such as Mr. Campbell
and his wife) buy low-coverage auto liability insurance, the
insurance company agrees to provide limited protection
against the risk that the driver will be liable for damages in
an auto accident. 23 As part of this liability insurance
protection, auto insurance companies assume responsibility
for defending the insured driver in the event of litigation
over liability (fault) for an auto accident. Additionally, as
part of that contractual duty to defend an insured driver,
the insurance company has a legal obligation to settle the
accident liability claim brought against the policyholding
driver if that settlement would be in the insured driver's
interest. 24 Lawyers representing auto accident victims
frequently seek to settle accident liability cases before trial
for the amount of the driver's insurance policy limit in order
to avoid the costs and uncertainty of litigation and because
of concern that any judgment awarded after trial against
the driver exceeding the limits of the liability
insurance
policy will be difficult or impossible to collect. 25

20. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1148, 1172
(Utah 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
21. Id. at 1141 n.2.
22. Id. at 1141.
23. See Tom Baker, Liability InsuranceConflicts and Defense Lawyers: From
Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 106 (1997-98) (quoting and
explaining language in the standard insurance contract).
24. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136 (1954).

25. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAw & Soc'y REV. 275, 289-90 (2001) (discussing findings
from a study based on interviews with tort lawyers).

20081

CLASS INEQUALITY

1041

But auto insurers may face incentives to shirk their
contractual obligation to accept reasonable settlement
offers when they represent drivers whose insurance policies
have low insurance coverage limits (such as the Campbells'
$50,000 limit per accident). If the auto insurance company
calculates the costs and benefits over a large pool of lowcoverage policyholders, the insurance company may
rationally decide it can profit from refusing settlement
offers in litigation over auto accident liability, even when
these settlement offers are likely to protect the insured
driver from the risk of high damage awards at trial. In
some portion of auto accident liability cases, when the
question of accident fault goes to trial the liability case
against the insured driver will end up being stronger than
originally expected. But the driver's low insurance coverage
limits will protect the insurance company against this
downside risk that the court will award greater damages
against a driver than would have been paid under the
proposed settlement offer. For the insurance company, the
worst that can happen if it refuses to settle the accident
liability case is that it will have to pay the small maximum
coverage amount that it would have likely paid anyway
under the initially proposed settlement. On the other hand,
an insurance company can expect that some portion of auto
accident claims brought to trial will result in little or no
damages awarded against the insured driver, and in those
cases the insurance company can save money by refusing
settlements that seem reasonable prior to the trial.
For insurance policyholders, however, this refusal to
settle substantially erodes their contractual right to
insurance protection: it significantly increases the insured's
(and possibly the insured's accident victim's) exposure to
the risk of large, unpredictable losses. In Mr. Campbell's
case, for instance, the verdict from the liability trial was
five times the policy limit, and the lawyer for State Farmrepresenting the insurer and the insured-suggested selling
26
the Campbell's home to cover the cost of the award.
Reviewing the trial court decision, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that "the Campbells lived for nearly eighteen
months under constant threat of losing everything they had

26. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1142.
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worked for their whole lives. This threat led to
sleeplessness, heartache, and stress in the Campbells'
marriage and family relationships. '27 Further, the trial
court found that State Farm's deceitful conduct toward the
Campbells was part of a company-wide practice that
particularly targeted vulnerable groups of policyholders
(like low-income racial and ethnic minorities, women, and
the elderly) who would be unlikely to28 take legal action
challenging insurers' breach of contract.
Utah, like some other states, has adopted particular
substantive legal rules to address the problem of these
economic incentives for insurance companies to violate
insureds' contractual rights: it gives liability insurance
policyholders the right to sue insurance companies in tort
for fraud and bad faith breach of contract. 29 The
policyholders here were able to bring a successful state tort
action, and the Utah Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict
awarding $145 million in punitive damages on top of $1
million in compensatory damages, with ninety percent of
the damages going to victims of Mr. Campbell's auto
accident. 30 The state court justified the high punitive
damage award as reasonable deterrence, given the nature
and the risk that the
and impact of the wrongdoing
31
wrongdoing would continue.
Why did the U.S. Supreme Court not simply defer to
this result on the ground that state governments have the
right to adopt and enforce substantive rules protecting their
own views of the interests of consumers over the possibly
competing interests of corporate defendants? After all, postLochner jurisprudence claims to protect such economic and
political judgments from judicial interference. Nonetheless,
the Court turned this substantive policy choice into a
problem of fundamental constitutional rights to due
process. The Court's reasoning raises four interrelated
27. Id. at 1149.
28. Id. at 1148.
29. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); see also STEMPEL, supra note 11, at 218-22 (discussing Utah's bad
faith case law and the trial court's interpretation of the doctrine).
30. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1172.
31. Id. at 1147-50, 1154-58.
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procedural problems that, on closer examination, rest on
substantive policy judgments about economic class.
A. Class and Arbitrary Law Enforcement
First, according to the Court's majority opinion,
punitive damages that greatly outstrip compensatory
damages risk depriving business owners of property
through arbitrary coercion, rather than law. 32 The Court
stressed the danger of allowing broad state discretion in
using punitive damages to further the goals of deterrence
and retribution apart from compensation. 33 The Court
reasoned that great discretion and variability in punishment
punishment
for similar wrongs create opportunities for 34
based on arbitrary, unpredictable whim or bias.
What is the class problem with this? In theory, the
flexibility and individualized nature of discretionary
decision-making can promote or destroy justice, depending
on how we view the power relationship involved in one
party's exercise of discretionary judgment over another's. If
the decisionmaker's power over a subject is viewed as
normal, legitimate, and largely benevolent, then discretion
will seem likely to ensure fairness because it gives the
decisionmaker more power to take into account specific
needs and circumstances that might elude more rigid rules.
On the other hand, if the decisionmaker's power over
another is viewed as aberrant, not fully authoritative, or
normally tainted with bias or malice, then sharp restraints
on that discretion will seem to promote justice by
transferring more power to a decisionmaking entity
perceived as more legitimate and trustworthy.
In State Farm, the Court discusses the dangers of
discretion in punishment by comparing wealthy corporate
defendants in civil suits to criminal defendants. 35 But in
cases deciding the rights of criminal defendants, who are
overwhelmingly non-wealthy (and disproportionately non-

32. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
33. Id. at 417-18.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 417.
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white), the Court has taken the opposite position about due
process and discretion, as Adam Gershowitz has explained. 36
In McCleskey v. Kemp,37 for example, the Court rejected the
argument that Georgia's death penalty is racially
discriminatory because its discretionary nature leads to
disproportionate death sentences for black defendants in
cases with white murder victims. 38 In McCleskey, the Court
worried that a substantive right to judicial protection from
racially disparate criminal penalties would undermine the
discretion by jurors and prosecutors that it deemed more
essential to fundamental fairness. 39 Indeed, McCleskey
reasoned that preserving state discretion in punishment
was so crucial to due process that it should be protected
even at the risk of promoting prejudice and arbitrary
discrimination. 40 More recently, in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales,41 the Supreme Court denied a claim that a local
government violated a domestic violence victim's procedural
due process rights. In that case, the police had failed to
respond to a woman's repeated calls requesting enforcement
of a court restraining order against her estranged husband,
who kidnapped and then murdered her children. 42 The
Court decided that mandatory, individualized court orders
directing arrest nonetheless could be appropriately viewed as
discretionary by local police. 43 It concluded that
constitutional due process principles recognize the public's
interest in maintainingdiscretionary law enforcement, and
it rejected any individual right to predictable enforcement
of court orders protecting against private deprivation of life
or liberty. 44

36. Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive
CriminalPunishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV.
1249, 1288-1301 (2000).
37. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
38. Id. at 286-97.
39. Id. at 296-97, 308-13.
40. Id. at 308-11.
41. 545 U.S. 748, 751-54, 768 (2005).
42. Id. at 751-54, 768.
43. See id. at 760-62.
44. See id. at 761-66.
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In contrast to those cases, the Court's special scrutiny
for the discretion exercised by juries awarding punitive
damages against corporate defendants seems to reflect a
heightened concern about the basic legitimacy of subjecting
large corporations to the control of the state legal process.
Although both Castle Rock and McCleskey involve questions
of power over life or death, states' power to impose punitive
damages on corporations appears more fundamentally
suspect. Perhaps this striking contrast stems from implicit
assumptions about entitlement to unchecked power by
defendant corporations (as well as from an implicit
assumption of disentitlement linked to race and gender
disadvantage in the other cases involving criminal
defendants and domestic violence victims).
The Court seems to assume that wealthy owners of
corporate capital, whose interests are protected by the State
Farm ruling, must be afforded wide protection from
accountability and constraint when it comes to concerns
about deterrence of unlawful profit-seeking. The Court treats
criminal defendants or victims of domestic violence as
normally and naturally (and beneficially) subject to the
regulatory authority of criminal juries or police, even though
it recognizes that these authorities can be irrational or
unwise. But, in the Court's view, the authority of state courts
to regulate the organized interests of capital owners appears
less normal and natural (and less obviously beneficial).
The contrast between the Court's criticism of discretion
in State Farm compared to its deference to discretion in the
other cases is even more striking considering the potential
for checking abuses of discretion in the different cases. In
Castle Rock and McCleskey, the Court reasoned that the
problem of improper discretion in law enforcement is best
left to state political majorities. 45 In this implicit logic,
protection of criminal defendants and domestic violence
victims against arbitrary application of law is first and

45. Id. at 768-69; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319. Of course, in Castle Rock, the
legislature had already acted to constrain the discretion of local law
enforcement, but the majority interpreted a statutory "mandate" to instead
authorize discretion, reasoning that the language 'shall use every reasonable
means to enforce a restraining order' (or even 'shall arrest . . . or . . . seek a
warrant')" leaves police broad power to decide how to respond. Castle Rock, 545
U.S. at 761-62 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a), (b) (2004)).
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foremost a matter of contingent political power, not
fundamental legal process. In contrast, State Farm
assumed that large corporations cannot be left to the
vagaries of the political process to obtain protection from
abuse of discretion in state civil law enforcement. 46 For
organized capital (as opposed to individual criminal
defendants or domestic violence victims) federal judicial
protection must supplement political power. It would be
absurd to defend this distinction on the grounds that large,
wealthy corporations (and their owners) are more
systematically disadvantaged than criminal defendants or
domestic violence victims in either the state justice systems
or in state politics. 47 As Mark Galanter has extensively
shown, corporations have disproportionate power to ensure
their interests get attention and weight in both state
judicial and political systems. 48
B. Class and FairNotice of Penalties
Second, State Farm identified lack of notice as a reason
that the discretionary award of corporate punitive damages
poses a potential procedural problem. 49 The Court
explained that the Constitution requires fair notice not just
about what counts as wrongdoing, but also about the
severity of penalties for that wrongdoing. 50 Here, the Court
is focusing on the harmful impact of these damages on
business entities, instead of on the questionable intent or
rationality of those with discretion to award punitive
damages. As the Court explained, "the point of due process
...is to allow citizens to order their behavior. 5

46. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417
(2003).
47. See STEMPEL, supra note 11, at 521 (criticizing the Court's constitutional
protection from punitive damages for businesses with "plenty of clout in state
legislatures and courts").
48. See Galanter, supranote 13, at 1376-92 (discussing evidence of corporate
power in the civil justice system); id. at 1398-99 (discussing evidence of
corporate political power).
49. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416-17.
50. Id. at 417.
51. Id. at 418.
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This concern about predictability and order is
particularly dubious in the context of punitive damages
against large corporate defendants, which are not "citizens"
but formal legal entities that can be dismantled,
reorganized,
and reconstituted. Returning
to the
comparison with others who may face severe harm from
arbitrary exercises of discretion in the justice system,
consider the extent to which unpredictable enforcement of
"mandatory" court protective orders might cause terror and
destruction in the daily lives of victims of domestic violence,
or how a discretionary death penalty highly subject to
prejudice might affect innocent criminal defendants (or
those otherwise deserving of mercy or exoneration), as well
as their families and communities. 52 Many of the real
human beings facing those threats of potentially arbitrary
death will be particularly likely to lack economic, legal, and
social resources. In contrast, large and wealthy corporate
entities should be particularly able to take rational steps to
prevent, mitigate, and hedge against the very small chance
of very severe harm from punitive damages. Indeed,
insurance company defendants would seem especially
capable of orderly planning in the face of such large and
variable risks, as that form of risk management is the
substantive core of their business. If such large, wealthy
companies do not always appear fully competent at
managing their own highly variable risks of punitive
damages, it might be that their huge reserves of capital
sometimes make preventing even large punitive damage
awards not worth the trouble to senior management, at
least ex ante.
Furthermore, in companies with huge financial assets,
even quite high unanticipated punitive damage awards may
be readily folded into normal operating losses without
noticeable disruption. For example, the trial court in State
Farm found that the company had been prepared to absorb
the cost of a previous $100 million punitive damage award
for similar conduct without the knowledge (much less major

52. See, e.g., Rachel King & Katherine Norgard, What About Families?
Using the Impact on Death Row Defendants' Family Members as a Mitigating
Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 112627, 1138-60, 1172 (1999) (discussing the profound harmful impact of the current
unfair death penalty on the families of death row inmates).
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disruption) of corporate headquarters. 53 The U.S. Supreme
Court dismissed this evidence of a previous damage award,
noting that the case ultimately settled for a fraction of the
verdict. 54 However, this ultimate result suggests a reason
why the highly uncertain risks of high punitive damages
may not cause disorder in very wealthy corporate
defendants: corporate management may make a rational,
orderly business calculation to ignore such risks at the
highest levels because (at least ex ante) the likely shortterm benefits of taking the risks outweigh the very unlikely
chance of long-term bad outcomes. Indeed, managers of
business defendants may rationally decide that the
cheapest way to manage the risk of such very rare, very
high punitive damage awards (while maximizing gains from
potential and actual wrongdoing) is to litigate after the fact
of an award in the expectation of changing the punitive
damage rules in their favor.5 5 Following that logic, the
Court's concern about protecting corporate defendants from
unpredictable damage awards is a self-fulfilling prophesy:
the due process protection from punitive damages seems
necessary to orderly business only because defendant
companies appear to have decided to plan their business
around constitutional intervention to obtain a different,
more profitable legal order.
The real issue underlying the Court's reasoning,
therefore, is not the proceduralproblem that highly variable
punitive damage awards preclude rational calculation and
control, but rather the substantive problem of the
distributive results from planning for that risk. A system
without constitutional protection from highly uncertain
costs of occasional punitive damage awards would likely
lead corporate managers and investors not to irrational

53. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1147 (Utah
2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
54. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427 (finding also that this previous damage
award was irrelevant out of state evidence).
55. As one example, in the state litigation of the bad faith tort claim in State
Farm, the company apparently chose to bear the risk of punitive damages
rather than the cost of serious settlement negotiations. See STEMPEL, supra note
11, at 220, 516 (stating that State Farm "never offered to settle the Campbell
bad faith claim for anything more than payment of the $50,000 policy limits and
the excess judgment in the [accident liability] trial").
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economic chaos, but to different rational economic
responses-perhaps managers would raise prices (with the
risk of loss in competitive consumer markets), lower
investors' profits (with the risk of loss in the competitive
capital markets), or strengthen corporate policies
constraining illegal behavior (forgoing illegally obtained
profits). Even a risk of occasional arbitrarily high punitive
damage awards leading to the failure of a particular
business entity would not necessarily mean economic
disorder for capital owners, given that the existing financial
system is arguably ordered around highly speculative
investment practices dependent on chance as much as on
rational calculation 56-and in which capital owners may
have sufficient market and political power to secure
government bailouts to cover the worst speculative losses.57
Reading between the lines of the Court's reasoning, the risk
of highly variable damages for similar corporate injuries is
not really a problem of procedural predictability or notice,
but of substantive class power.
The Court hinted its implicit substantive class agenda
when it rejected the theory that extreme wealth reduces the
potential for harmful disorder from very high punitive
damages. In that theory, punitive damages more effectively
deter corporate wrongdoing when tied to the wealth of a
corporation (rather than to the amount of compensatory
damages). That is because the presence or absence of
extensive capital assets routinely and rationally affects
economic calculations about the costs and benefits of using
wrongful behavior to pursue potentially high long-term
rewards, as well as calculations about the costs of defending

56. See, e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM (1997) (characterizing the
global economic "order" as a casino, produced by government policies aimed at
promoting volatility and disorder).
57. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an

Insurer Near Failure,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al; Andrew Ross Sorkin &
Mary Williams Walsh, Giant InsurerMay Get More in U.S. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2008, at Al (explaining the original bailout plan for AIG has been
increased to a total expected $150 billion from taxpayers); Bailing Away
(Editorial), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at B7 (criticizing lack of conditions on the
federal government's commitment of $1 trillion to bail out Citigroup, following
"nearly $8 trillion pledged in loans, guarantees, and investments to financial
firms" in the 2008 economic crisis).
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against legal challenges to such wrongdoing. 58 From this
perspective, broad state discretion to award punitive
damages targeted to the wealth of the wrongdoer could
logically increaselawful order in the market.
In short, a risk of large awards linked to corporate
wealth logically might induce large companies and their
wealthy capital owners to more consistently and effectively
treat legal rules as reasonable limitations on their actions.
The very disordering potential of high punitive damages
logically is their proper purpose. Punitive damages should
be calculated in such a way as to change corporate
calculations in which illegal and reprehensible conduct is
part of a routine plan to maximize profit. 59 By encouraging
wealthy capital owners to increase compliance with the law,
high punitive damage awards arguably enhance the goals of
predictability and transparency that are at the heart of the
idea of ensuring a rule of law sufficient to provide fair
notice to competing interests.
In a 2008 non-constitutional decision using federal
Maritime law to limit a punitive damage award, the
Supreme Court further emphasized the problem of
predictability from highly variable punitive damages. 60 In
that case, Exxon, which in 2007 reported the largest annual
profit in U.S. history at $40.6 billion, 61 convinced the
highest court to protect it from an award of $2.5 billion
arising from its culpability for the Valdez oil spill. 62 The

58. See STEMPEL, supra note 11, at 520 (explaining that prohibiting
consideration of a corporate defendant's wealth, although intended to protect
the rich against "Robin Hood" takings of their property, instead "tends to
thwart rational application of punitive damages policy").
59. See id. at 517 (criticizing the Supreme Court's ruling by concluding that
"[t]he net effect of this comparative slap on the wrist for State Farm has to be to
encourage businesses to look at punitive liability as just another risk of doing
business that can be reserved against so that the business need not be deterred
from pursuing any gainful business strategy, even one that might systematically
injure clients, customers, or policyholders to whom a high duty is owed").
60. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip op. at 25-26 (U.S.
June 25, 2008).
61. See Associated Press, Exxon Mobil Posts $40.6 Billion Annual Profit,
MSNBC, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22949325/.
62. See Exxon Shipping Co., No. 07-219, at 4 (capping the damages at the
amount of compensatory harm: $507.5 million).

2008]

CLASS INEQUALITY

1051

Court argued that the unpredictability of the severity of
damage awards undermined rather than furthered
deterrence goals, because a "bad man" looks at the
punishment for "his counterparts" wreaking similar harm
to decide what the stakes are in choosing one course of
action over another. 63 But even if a sure risk of severe
punishment is a better deterrent than an uncertain risk of
severe punishment, it does not logically follow that a more
certain risk of much lower damages will be a better
deterrent than a variable risk of very high damages when it
comes to wrongdoing by wealthy business entities. Again,
by dramatically reducing punitive damages to improve
predictability, the Court is effectively changing the
substance of what is predicted, not the effectiveness of the
process. Faced with this new judicial assurance of relatively
insignificant damages, corporate managers considering
wrongdoing now will rationally make a new calculation:
they can be more certain that unlawful activity will bring
high profits at low cost.
C. Class and Evidence of Harm to Others
Third, the Court explained that the punitive damages
in State Farm violated both procedural and substantive due
process because the high award was based on evidence the
Court judged to be irrelevant to the injury in the Campbells'
case.6 4 Utah's highest court justified the large punitive
damages award as punishment for the insurance company's
policy of using claims fraud as "a consistent way of doing
business for the last twenty years"'6 5 that had caused the
harm to this particular policyholder as well as "vast
numbers of other Utah customers. '66 In overturning the
state court decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned that due process prevents states from using
punitive damage awards to punish "other parties'

63. See id. at 29.
64. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23
(2003).
65. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1154 (Utah
2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
66. Id. at 1153.
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hypothetical claims ' 67 and instead requires that states mete
out punishment only for defendant's conduct, "not for being
an unsavory individual or business. ' 68
How is this dispute over the relevance of out-of-state
evidence about class? The Supreme Court's limitation on
evidence helps to restrict states from recognizing and
responding to the class-based identity and class-based
interests involved in tort litigation against corporate
defendants. The Utah Supreme Court explained that the
evidence of broader corporate wrongdoing was important to
understanding the cause and nature of the wrongdoing that
harmed the Campbells and why that conduct was so
reprehensible, malicious, and difficult to detect and deter. 69
In the state court's view, the broader evidence showed the
wrongdoing was not a mistake or an isolated incidence of
incompetence or animosity toward the Campbells, but
instead, was a "method of doing business ' 70 and a "profit
scheme" that involved systematic claims fraud as well as
systematic efforts to cover-up this wrongdoing, including
routine destruction of documents as well as harassment and
intimidation of claimants, attorneys, and witnesses. 71 By
tracing the injury to the conscious, calculated pursuit of
overall corporate profits by high-level corporate officers and
owners, the state court construed the evidence of different
types of fraud in different types of claims as closely related
parts of a unified wrongful plan of action. 72 The bad faith
refusal to settle that harmed the Campbells in their auto
liability case could be particularly likely to rationally
maximize profits if the victims of wrongdoing were treated
as part of a generalized, aggregated pool where a high
volume of relatively small fraudulent gains would offset the
risk of being caught and penalized.
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court majority reasoned
that the detailed evidence of systematic claims fraud

67. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
68. Id.
69. See Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1153, 1159.
70. Id. at 1159
71. Id. at 1148.
72. See id. at 1158.
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planned and promoted by high-level managers against
thousands of policyholders was irrelevant to determining
the reprehensibility of the corporate wrongdoing against
the Campbells because that systematic corporate claims
fraud included different kinds of illegal actions in different
types of insurance. 73 This reasoning individualizes and
trivializes the problem of corporate wrongdoing, steering
away from a picture that would recognize the dispute
between the Campbells and the corporation as a serious
conflict of collective economic interests between consumers
of modest income and wealthy corporations. In addition, the
Court's treatment of the evidence helps to obscure a
structural analysis of class that would see harm not just as
tragic but as unjust: a matter of intentional, systematic
gain for the wrongdoer rather than simply a loss to the
victim. By steering the inquiry away from large-scale
corporate policy, the Court evades inquiry into the
substantial gain to the corporate
calculated, organized, and
74
managers and owners.
But what about the State Farm majority's reasoning
that evidence of the corporation's broader claims fraud
scheme shifts the punishment from conduct to status? The
Court's concern that states might use punitive damages to
penalize a tort defendant for being an "unsavory individual
or business" hints at the problem of class status in
particular. The Court's effective "strict scrutiny" of evidence
of corporate wrongdoing implies it is attempting to enforce
a "class-blind" approach to punitive damage awards that
ensures state tort law punishes capital owners only for
individual corporate acts of fraud, but not for being part of
an economically powerful collective organized to maximize
profit at the expense of less powerful economic actors.
This logic in effect constructs a one-sided bar to
consciousness of class. As the Utah courts seemed to see it,
the corporation's wrongful conduct specifically targeted
class status in this case. State Farm designed its claims
73. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-24
(2003).
74. Compare the Utah Supreme Court's ruling finding that evidence
supported the jurys conclusion that "State Farm specifically calculated and
planned to avoid full payment of claims, regardless of their validity." Campbell,
65 P.3d at 1149.
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practices to defraud Mr. Campbell not because he was a
consumer of a particular insurance line-such as auto
rather than home-but because he was an economically
vulnerable policyholder who could be treated as part of a
statistical group sharing a common situation of low
coverage levels and lack of substantial socioeconomic
power-a class status that provided opportunities for
enhancing the wealth of those who effectively controlled the
corporation.7 5 Since it viewed the illegal corporate conduct
as a problem of using class power to subvert the law, the
Utah Court remained conscious of class in tailoring the
remedy so that it would punish and deter this class power
in particular. From that perspective, using evidence of class
in tailoring the remedy (punitive damages) is not irrational
prejudice irrelevant to the wrongdoing, but is precisely the
tool needed to correct illegal class-based harm.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court's effort to
distinguish punishment for wrongful acts from punishment
for identity draws too simplistically on the metaphor of the
individual defendant. In cases involving punitive damages,
the defendants are "artificial persons," organized as
business entities according to formal rules governing their
purpose and structure.76 Broad judgments about the
common interests and motivations underlying the conduct
of those entities are more rational and fair than in the case
of individual human beings. After all, corporate identity is
defined by law, and that legal identity (in the U.S.)
constructs corporations as the organized, narrow, and
economic interests of capital owners.
Subsequent cases developing the constitutional doctrine
limiting evidence in punitive damage cases have further
narrowed the vision of class consciousness, reinforcing a
picture in which class is a problem of individual illegitimate

75. State Farm Auto Insurance Company is technically organized as a
mutual insurance company in which policyholders, rather than outside
investors, theoretically "own" the company and reap its gains in the form of
Farm
Companies,
State
See
StateFarmInsurance.com,
dividends.
http://www.statefarm.com/about/companie.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
However, policyholders are not likely to exercise actual significant control, and
executives and other wealthy capital owners are likely to be able to hoard and
divert profits for their own benefit.
76. See Galanter, supranote 13.
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prejudice rather than a rational understanding of real,
relevant, and shared economic interests and incentives. 77 In
a 2007 ruling, the Supreme Court remanded a case
involving a punitive damage award against a tobacco
company for deceit in cigarette marketing, insisting that
evidence of even similar harm to others must be used only
to prove the reprehensibility of the conduct that produced
the harm in the case at hand, not to punish the corporation
for its conduct more generally. 78 Though this elusive
distinction is likely to be more confusing than helpful in
fostering predictable, non-arbitrary rules for limiting
punitive damage awards, it may be more coherent and
workable if understood as a means of masking and delegitimizing class consciousness among those at risk of
harm from illegal corporate profit-seeking.
D. Class and Conflicting Substantive Interests
Finally, and most explicitly, the State Farm decision
constitutionalizes class inequality by interpreting conscious
class opposition to wealthy capital owners as fundamentally
arbitrary and irrational. The Court's central concern may
be that high punitive damage awards are likely to reflect
intentional class resentment by the non-wealthy. The
majority opinion quoted an earlier precedent warning that
"juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
businesses" 79 and also noted that the Utah court had taken
into account State Farm's massive wealth in measuring
meaningful deterrence and punishment.8 0 Turning the
famous Carolene Products Footnote Four on its head, the
Court rules that wealthiest, most organized capital
against
interests deserve special constitutional protection
substantive policymaking and law enforcement.81

77. For an in-depth critique of the conventional analysis of class, see Martha
Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the AntiTransformationCases, 76 S.CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003).
78. See Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007).
79. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (quoting
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 532 (1994)).
80. See id. at 427.
81. See McCluskey, supra note 8, at 1497-98.
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How does the Court turn a seemingly rational interest
in consumer protection-or in restraining illegal gain by the
wealthy from the disadvantaged-into irrational hatred?
Just as the Court's view implies that corporate capital
owners' interests are inherently legitimate, however
unlawful, 8 2 the Court implicitly views opposing economic
interests as inherently illegitimate, however lawful. But
why consider jurors' feelings against a specific corporate
entity as generalizable beyond this case if harm to others is
irrelevant to consideration of the merits of a punitive
damage award? When it considered the possibility of
corporations as victims rather than corporations as
wrongdoers, the Court seemed willing to construct the
corporate defendant as part of a generalizable collective
with common economic interests and identity. That is, it
accepts-indeed constitutionalizes-a class consciousness
that adopts the perspective of wealthy capital owners. In
this view, capital owners' organized and collective gain at
the expense of the non-wealthy is a fundamentally normal,
natural, and just exercise of power, while organized efforts
to protect competing economic interests of the non-wealthy
are fundamentally unfair, not just debatable policy.
III. CLASS AND THE RULE OF LAW
In sum, State Farm offers a grim window into the
ideology of class that is gaining power in law and in culture.
In this warped vision, substantive legal rules are construed
as emotional, prejudicial, and special-interested class
warfare if they promote class equality. Substantive legal
rules are construed as rational, public-interested fairness if
they are about consolidating class inequality and
concentrated economic power.
Finally, this case suggests some clues for uncovering
and retelling the story of economic class in constitutional
doctrine. The legal infrastructure of class inequality goes
beyond rules allocating discrete economic resources
between groups. Constitutional questions of class should
also go beyond the question of whether minimal economic
82. See supraPart II.A (analyzing the court's implicit and special protection
of an entitlement to profit by business defendants even when those profits
arguably violate state law).
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security is important to democratic citizenship. 83 Analyzing
recent doctrine, Julie Nice argues that U.S. constitutional
law uses an unacknowledged double standard for due
process and equal protection that systematically denies
84
poor people basic constitutional rights available to others.
To find class, we must look under the surface questions of
overt "redistribution" and affirmative economic rights to
examine the way in which unequal class privileges and
penalties become folded into the background as natural and
necessary to the public order-becoming matters of basic
neutrality, rather than substantive policy judgment. The
class-based message and material impact of State Farm
may not be so much that it limits money (punitive damages)
that might otherwise have gone from wealthy investors'
profits (or executive bonuses) to policyholders with modest
income and their victims, or even that its contribution to
the developing doctrine limiting punitive damages will help
shift money from plaintiff consumers in general to corporate
defendants. After all, punitive damage awards are
exceedingly rare85 and corporations are overwhelmingly
successful in defeating plaintiffs' claims. 86 Instead, State
Farm's greater class significance may be its contribution to
shoring up a world view where class inequality seems
central to the rule of law.

83. For a discussion of this question of "social citizenship" and an analysis of
the relationship between questions of basic economic protection and broader
civil and political rights, see Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social
Citizenship: Challengingthe NeoliberalAttack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J.
783 (2003).
84. See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of
Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & DialogicDefault, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629
(2008).
85. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron
Cage, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1298-99 & nn.8-9 (2005).
86. See Galanter, supra note 13, at 1387-98.

